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ABSTRACT 
Small countries can represent a suitable market for Small 
Medium Reactors (SMR). Among them Switzerland is one the 
more interesting since already hosts five commercial nuclear 
reactors; three of them are SMR (about 370 MWe) and two are 
large units (985 and 1165 MWe). Since the oldest units are 
about 40 year- old the Swiss utilities wereplanning to replace 
them while adding new nuclear power capacity to the portfolio 
mix. . Most recently, a radical re-thinking of the country energy 
policy is taking place as a Fukushima accident’s aftermath. 
Debate is about abandoning nuclear power and replacing it with 
renewable new capacity and import.  
“Economiesuisse, the umbrella organisation for Swiss business, 
considers a premature abandonment of atomic energy 
<irresponsible>. Without valid alternatives, Economiesuisse 
warns, abandoning the nuclear option will have serious 
consequences for Swiss industry”. Also “the environmental 
organisationsrecognise that the discussion on energy policy – 
which will really heat up with the parliamentary debate in June 
– is not solely an ideological one. Financial and economic 
considerations are likely to make all the difference” (L.Jorio, 
“What price a future without nuclear 
energy?”,www.swissinfo.ch, May 17, 2011).An objective and 
unbiased estimation of the cost of new nuclear power is 
essential to Policy Makers and a focus on SMR economic 
potential is a further contribution to the debate. SMR advanced 
passive safety features may cope with public concerns about 
safety, which has become a priority. Polimi’s INCAS model has 
been developed to compare the investment in SMR respect to 
LR and is able to assess the financial/economic indicators 
arising from these two alternative investment options. In 
particular the INCAS model provides the value of IRR (Internal 
Rate of Return), NPV (Net Present Value), Upfront investment, 
etc. A stochastic approach to the data elaboration and the 
implementation of a Montecarlo analysis provide the evaluation 
of the investment risk profile. 
Results show that investment returns are comparable  for LR 
and SMR; however SMR require a lower upfront investment, 
thus representing lower sunk costs and more affordable and 
scalable investment option than monolithic LR. 
INTRODUCTION: NUCLEAR POWER IN 
SWITZERLAND 
1.1 Switzerland and Nuclear Power in Switzerland 
 
Switzerland has an Area of 41,285 sq km and e Population  
7,807,000abitants . The Capitals are Bern (administrative), 
Lausanne (judicial) Switzerland is divided into three regions: 
the meadow-covered Jura Mountains; the central Mittelland, a 
rich agricultural and urbanized area; and the lofty crags of the 
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Alps. It is one of the world’s major financial centres; its 
economy is based largely on international trade and banking, as 
well as light and heavy industries. It is a federal state with two 
legislative houses; its head of state and government is the 
president of the Federal Council. [1]. Electricity consumption 
in Switzerland has been growing at about 2% per year since 
1980.  In 2007 electricity production was 68 billion kWh gross, 
mostly from nuclear and hydro, requiring 2.5 TWh net import 
to match demand – less than previous years.  A lot of electricity 
is imported from France and Germany and up to 26 TWh/yr 
exported to Italy.  Per capita consumption is 7650 kWh/yr.  In 
2007 nuclear power contributed 26.5 TWh net, 43% of Swiss 
demand.  
Switzerland's electricity supply is secured by approximately 
850 companies.  Many of the electricity works in towns and 
cities are also responsible for supplying water and gas.  In some 
cantons and towns, a single vertically integrated company is 
responsible for the entire supply chain, while in other cantons a 
variety of companies share this responsibility. Approximately 
80 percent of the electricity supply company capital totaling 
around 5.6 billion Swiss francs is held by the public sector, 
while the remaining 20 percent is held by private companies (in 
Switzerland and abroad).Approximately 83 percent of the 
electricity supply company capital totaling around 5.2 billion 
Swiss francs is held by the public sector, while the remaining 
17 percent is held by private companies (in Switzerland and 
abroad). 
In 2009, end-user electricity consumption totaled 57.5 billion 
kWh, and domestic producers generated a total of 66.5 billion 
kWh. Cross-border electricity trading is of major significance 
for Switzerland, both economically and in terms of supply 
security. In 2009, 52.0 billion kWh were imported and 54.2 
billion kWh were exported. The electricity trading balance for 
2009 was around 1.5 billion Swiss francs. 
 
Private households, industry and the services sector each 
account for one-third of Switzerland's electricity consumption. 
The proportion of electricity to overall energy demand is 
approximately 23 percent. [2] 
 
Hydropower plants account for around 55 percent of domestic 
production, followed by nuclear power plants (40 percent) and 
conventional thermal energy / renewable energy plants 
(approximately 5 percent). 
Switzerland has 5 nuclear reactors. Two large new units are 
planned. [3] 
 
Reactors Operator Type 
Net 
MWe 
First 
power 
Expected closure 
(approx) 
Beznau 1 NOK PWR 365 1969 2019 
Beznau 2 NOK PWR 365 1971 2021 
Gösgen KKG/Alpiq PWR 985 1979 2029 
Mühleberg BKW BWR 372 1971 2022 
Leibstadt NOK/Alpiq BWR 1165 1984 2034 
Table1Swiss NPP 
1.2 Scenarios in the pre- Fukushima events 
Replacement of the nuclear units was part of an energy policy 
announced by the country's government in 2007 to avoid 
predicted energy shortfalls by 2020 as reactors close and an 
electricity import agreement with France is phased out. 
Switzerland's other operating nuclear power plant, the 1165 
MWe Leibstadt BWR, is not scheduled for closure until 2034. 
[4] 
In late 2007 three Swiss energy companies have announced a 
joint venture called Resun with the purpose of replacing the 
Beznau and Muhleberg nuclear power plants in 2020. 
Resunwas formed by NordostschweizerischeKraftwerk (NOK, 
owned by Axpo Group), CentralschweizerischeKraftwerk 
(CFC) and BKM FMB Energie. Those companies own 57.75%, 
11% and 31.25% respectively of the new company, to be based 
in Aarau, but reserve the right to allow new members to join. In 
a statement, the companies said that Resun would submit 
paperwork at the end of 2008 towards permits to build nuclear 
power units of up to 1600 MWe at the Muhleberg and Beznau 
sites. Axpo and BKW said that they are convinced the Swiss 
population would support nuclear power alongside renewables 
and energy conservation in upcoming referendums on energy 
policy. [5] 
In 2008 Switzerland's President, Pascal Couchepin, said, "The 
issue of energy poses a huge challenge to our country. Nuclear 
power is not the only solution, but it is an important part of the 
solution." He said: "We must now conduct a rational public 
debate with all stakeholders." Bruno Pellaud, chairman of the 
Swiss Nuclear Forum expressed confidence that the Swiss 
people are aware of the advantages of nuclear energy for the 
security of energy supplies and the preservation of the 
environment and climate. [6] 
In late 2008 Axpo Group and BKW FMB Energy have filed 
framework permit applications to build two identical latest-
generation power plants should, up to 1600 MWe, and that 
only one manufacturer of a globally recognized technology 
should be considered. Furthermore, the companies say, the 
plants will use modern hybrid cooling towers that does not 
affect river water temperatures and are less visually obtrusive 
than conventional towers. At Niederamt, adjacent to but 
independent of the existing Gösgen nuclear power plant, the 
application was filed by Atel in June, meaning that applications 
for three new plants was under review. [7] 
In November 2010 the permit application process three new 
nuclear plants in Switzerland has taken a step forward with an 
in-principle decision from the federal safety regulator that the 
Niederamt, Beznau and Müheleberg sites are suitable for the 
purpose.   The utilities are working to address the requirements 
and recommendations brought up in ENSI's extensive reports 
on their applications. All three applications are for 1100 to 1600 
MWe advanced reactors of as-yet unspecified design using 
hybrid cooling systems to minimize water consumption. [4] 
In late 2010 Axpo and BKW have been joined by Alpiq to "join 
forces in further pursuing the planning and construction of two 
new nuclear power stations." This will replace old reactors and 
"compensate for long-term import agreements with France 
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which are due to expire." The concept of building new reactors 
at all three sites was approved by the Swiss Federal Nuclear 
Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) in November. [8] 
In early 2011 Residents of the Swiss canton of Bern have 
expressed their support for the construction of a new nuclear 
power plant at Mühleberg in a local referendum, but Nidwalden 
residents registered their opposition to a nuclear waste 
repository [9] 
 
1.3  Post – Fukushima event 
March 11 - Fukushima I nuclear accidents (further information 
in [10]) 
March 15 - Doris Leuthard, the Swiss energy minister, said 
Switzerland would suspend plans to build and replace nuclear 
plants. She said no new ones would be permitted until experts 
had reviewed safety standards and reported back. Their 
conclusions will apply to existing plants as well as planned 
sites. [11] 
April 11 –  The President Micheline Calmy-Rey said "We are 
examining several scenarios, including exit scenarios". [12] 
April 24 - Switzerland's economy minister said on Sunday it 
would be decades before the country could give up nuclear 
power completely but that in the meantime no new nuclear 
power plants should be built. [13] 
Late April - The obligatory insurance is being raised from 1 to 
1.8 billion Swiss francs ($2 billion), but a government agency 
estimates that a Chernobyl-style disaster might cost more than 4 
trillion francs -- or about eight times the country's annual 
economic output. [14] 
Early May - Operators of Swiss nuclear power plants will have 
to improve instrumentation as well as earthquake and flooding 
resistance after a safety review. The changes may be made 
during operation, said the safety authority, as there is no 
immediate danger. Plant operators now have until 31 August to 
submit details of the measures they propose to take to address 
these issues. [15] 
  
On the basis of the previous information it is possible to 
summarize the Swiss scenario in the following bullet points: 
 Nuclear Energy have a primary role in the Electricity 
production in Switzerland 
 Before the Fukushima event the government, utilities and 
population supported the nuclear energy and the 
replacement of aging NPP with new Large Reactor. 
 The plan was to replicate the same large design concepts 
for 3 reactors in 3 sites 
 The Fukushima accident dramatically changed the 
prospective and, because of safety concerns, set a radical 
re-thinking of the country’s energy strategy. 
Since safety and economics confirm as the major concerns in 
the public debate, SMR may represent a viable option even to 
new GEN-III large plants: small size allows for  enhanced 
design robustness and intrinsic safety than LR . The 
contribution of this paper is about the economic 
competitiveness of an SMR option against planned LR, which 
is not evident due to a relevant loss of economy of scale in 
capital costs..Finally, the issue investigated in this paper is: 
From the economic and financial point of view are the SMR 
viable and competitive with LR in the Swiss scenario? 
THE INCAS MODEL 
 
Polimi’s nuclear economics research group is developing the 
INCAS model as the founding theoric and simulation 
framework able to quantify the most meaningful financial, 
economical and strategic indicators of . 
INCAS (INtegrated model for the Competitiveness Assessment 
of SMR) is a unique model able to account for “economy of 
multiples” benefits that characterize SMR investment 
paradigm. 
For the purpose of this analysis , INCAS consider a given total 
power generation capacity, installed either through multiple 
SMR or single/few LR. A comparative methodology to evaluate 
the differential economic and financial 
advantages/disadvantages, offered by the two different plant 
configurations and technologies, is adopted. The so called 
“Investment Model” brings up all the main elements of an 
economic and financial analysis (revenues, operating and 
capital costs, financial costs) and relies upon a cash flow 
analysis over the plant lifetime. The output of the Investment 
Model is a set of indexes measuring the financial performances 
of the investment from the investor point of view: profitability 
for a private investor or economic soundness for a public 
stakeholder. The previous monetary factors must be merged 
with other strategic factors generally much more difficult to be 
translated in economic performance (e.g. social acceptability) 
but highly influencing the profitability of the investment. This 
factors have been analysed in the external factors model of 
INCAS, aiming to assess the project attractiveness for a private 
investor or for a public body (at governmental, ministry, public 
administration level) once that the decision to invest in NPP has 
been taken. 
This paper deals only with the investment model. 
 
The “Investment Model” is based on a Discounted Cash Flow 
model and provides the indicators of the investment’s financial 
performances (e.g. IRR, NPV, cash flow profile). It includes the 
following modules: 
 Generation costs (construction costs and operating costs, 
operation & maintenance, fuel cycle and decontamination 
& decommissioning); 
 Revenues (plant’s availability factor, electricity sale price); 
 Financial (sources of financing, cost of capital, debt 
amortization period). 
 4 Copyright © 2011 by ASME 
 
Figure 1The INCAS model 
 
 
Unlike other simulation codes, INCAS’ Generation costs model 
is not a mere input section of the code: an original calculation 
routine allows to derive the construction costs of each 
successive NPP unit on the basis of its output size, design 
technology and learning accumulation. INCAS’ premise is that 
the cost of “n” NPP units is not equal to “n” times the cost of 
one NPP. Starting from a reference construction cost for a given 
design technology and a given reactor size, INCAS is able to 
calculate the construction cost for each of the successive NPP 
units of the same design technology, through a top-down 
estimation approach and on the basis of a given construction 
strategy in terms of schedule and site location. In particular the 
code takes into account: 
 economies of scale; 
 co-siting economies, due to fixed costs sharing by NPP 
built and operated on the same site; 
 construction cost savings, due to modularization effects, 
that are size-dependent; 
 learning economies, both at single site level and 
worldwide, with two different learning accumulation and 
decay laws; 
 effect of delay in the construction period; 
 cost of financing during construction period. 
THE DESIGN ROBUSTNESS OF SMR 
 
A high level of safety is the result of a complex interaction 
between good design, operational safety and human 
performances, but design features are able to impact on all of 
these three dimensions. Design robustness encompasses three 
key strategic performance areas: reactor safety, radiation safety 
(public and occupational) and safeguards, according to Reactor 
Oversight Process (ROP) of NRC [16]. From these key areas, 
we define Design Robustness the reactor’s capability to assure 
the core’s integrity, the protection and the integrity of all the 
other components of the nuclear island, in order to guarantee 
the radiation safety of personnel, population and environment 
in every condition. It’s possible to evaluate the size effecton 
design robustness considering the three areas separately. 
A complete picture of SMR design and implication on the 
safety features is provided by [17]. 
Reactor safety considers accidents leading to significant, 
unmitigated releases from containment. Core Damage 
Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 
are the most important indicators for this dimension.  Lower 
plant size allows for higher degree of passive safety features 
and design simplification as respect to LR. Such enhancements 
drive to the elimination of several classical event initiators and 
guarantee higher efficiency of mitigating systems. As an 
example, advanced SMR have integrated primary circuit in the 
reactor vessel with the absence of large penetrations and pipes 
in and out the reactor vessel: this eliminates the LOCA accident 
type. With internal CRDM there’s no ejection driving force.  
Large water inventory in reactor pressure vessel above the core 
permits passive core cooling through natural water convection. 
Long run/
risk 
opportunity
factors
Project 
Attractiveness
Multiattri
bute 
Evaluation
(MADM)
Investment Model
Generation 
cost module
Revenue 
module
Financial 
cost 
module
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As a result, safety-by-design approach of Westinghouse’s IRIS 
permits a reduction of CDF from 5.1x10-7 of a GENIII+ 
AP1000 to 10-8 [18]. IRIS LERF is around five orders of 
magnitude less than large PWRs and the other GEN III+ SMR 
designs have a three orders lower one [19]. Occupational 
Radiation Safety refers to operators’ overexposure risk. Plant 
workers can be exposed to a high-level radiation during the 
maintenance of reactor coolant pumps, pressurizers, water 
chambers of steam generators and during refueling. Operators 
exposure is then related to planned outages frequency for 
refueling and maintenance. SMR core is designed for extended 
life-cycle, reducing the frequency of operators activity in the 
nuclear island. 
IRIS had been designed to extend the need for scheduled 
outages to at least 48 months [18]. On the other side, outages 
are planned for each of multiple SMR units, considering the 
same installed power as LR. 
Total exposure depends on overall number and duration of 
outages, on single outage exposure for operator and on number 
of operators involved in activities. If utilities follow best 
common practices during outages, occupational exposure will 
not penalize SMRs. Public Radiation Safety considers 
collective radiation exposure to liquid and gaseous effluents 
from routine nuclear reactor operations. Each SMR has lower 
source term as compared to a LR. This is not true when we 
consider multiple the same total output at site level. On account 
of the higher safety performances estimated, studies have been 
done about the opportunity for the Regulator to reduce IRIS’ 
EPZ to the boundaries of the plant. Safeguards refer to physical 
protection of the facility and proliferation resistance. Charlton 
[20] produces a report that can be considered the most relevant 
for this theme, synthesizing the parameter in a likelihood scale 
from 0 to 1, where the highest is the value, the highest is the 
proliferation risk. For a typical PWR LR of GEN III this value 
is 0.07, while for a SMR case with a batch loading of the fuel 
the parameter becomes 0.06. 
Moreover, portion of SMRs’ containment can be located under 
the ground, as for IRIS, mPower, etc.: the cost would be 
prohibitive for LRs. This potential low SMRs’ profile makes 
them an extremely difficult target for aircraft flying terrorists.  
Design robustness is strictly design-specific but simplification, 
standardization and compactness of SMRs permit to obtain 
certain improvement on reactor safety and physical protection.  
COST OF NUCLEAR POWER IN SWITZERLAND: 
scenarios definition 
 
The most recent studies about the economics of nuclear power 
in Switzerland are summarized in Table 2and Table 6. However 
value in Table 2 are 5-year older than in Table 6, therefore the 
following analysis is based on the most recent values of Table 
6. Exchange rates are [21]: 
CHF/Euro 1.3 
CHF/USD 0.896 
USD/EUR 1.4 
Considering the economics of NPP the main drivers are: 
 Size, because of the Economy of scale application. 
Otherwise, INCAS assumes that the lower the size, the 
higher is the plant modularization and related 
construction cost savings. 
 Construction strategy in terms of : site co-location of 
units, deployment time-schedule. 
These factors determine the degree of learning, co-siting 
economies and interest capitalization over the construction 
period. Other country-specific input being equal (e.g. financial 
costs, EE price etc..) four different plant sizes are considered 
(1,565MWe, 1,200MWe, 300MWe and 150MWe) and 2 
different amount of total power installed. 
Table 4presents the siting configuration considering a total 
power of about 4700 MWe on three sites. 
Table 5 considers a more conservative scenario of about 3100 
MW on two sites. 
In both the scenarios one site can host either a Large stand 
stand-alone reactor or a number of SMR with equivalent power. 
 
Size MWe 1600 
Life Year 60 
Interest Rate % 5 8 
Construction cost 
included IDC 
Milion of CHF 3.7 4.2 
Specific construction cost Cent CHF /KWe 2400 2600 
Capital cost Cent CHF /KWe 2.0 2.7 
O&M Cent CHF /KWe 0.8 1.0 
Fuel Cent CHF /KWe 1.3 1.5 
LCOE Total Cent CHF /KWe 4.1 5.2 
Table 2 Costs according to [22] 
 
Cost Of Equity  [Ke, %] 10% 
Financing Mix [E/(E+D), %] 20% 
Debt Amortization Period [Y] 15 
Cost Of Debt [Kd, %] 5% 
Escalation Constr. Costs [%/Y] 2% 
Inflation [%/Y]  1.50%  
EE Price [CHF Per Mwh] 80 
EE Increase [%/Y] 1.5% 
Depreciation Fixed Assets [Y] 12.5 
Tax Rate [%] 25% 
Risk Free Rate 2.5% 
Table 3Financial parameters.[23]for general value,[24] for 
inflation and [25] for EE price 
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 site 1 site 2 site 3 Total 
1565 1565 1565 1565 4695 
num. of NPP 1 1 1 3 
1200 2400 1200 1200 4800 
num. of NPP 2 1 1 4 
300 1800 1800 1200 4800 
num. of NPP 6 6 4 16 
150 1800 1500 1500 4800 
num. of NPP 12 10 10 32 
Table 4Siting scenario 1 (3 LR) 
 
 
 
 
site 1 site 2 site 3 total 
1565 1565 1565 0 3130 
num. of NPP 1 1 0 2 
1050 2100 1050 0 3150 
num. of NPP 2 1 0 3 
300 1800 1200 0 3000 
num. of NPP 6 4 0 10 
150 1650 1500 0 3150 
num. of NPP 11 10 0 21 
Table 5Siting scenario 2 (2 LR) 
 
Country Net Capacity 
[MWe] 
Overnight Cost 
[USD/kWe] 
Decommissioning 
cost [USD/MWh] 
Fuel Cycle costs 
Decommissioning cost 
[USD/MWh] 
O&M costs 
[USD/MWh] 
LCOE 
[USD/MWh] 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
Switzerland 1600 5863 0.29 0.03 9.33 19.84 78.24 136.50 
1530 4043 0.16 0.01 9.33 15.40 57.83 96.74 
Table 6 Costs according to [26] 
REACTOR-SPECIFIC INPUT      
 V.LARGE LARGE LARGE MEDIUM SMALL 
Power [MWe] 1565 1200 1050 300 150 
Availability [%] 90% 93% 93% 95% 95% 
O&M [CHF/MWh] 15.727612 15.7 15.7 18.9 18.87313 
Fuel[CHF/MWh] 8.327958 8.327958 8.327958 8.327958 8.327958 
D&D [CHF/MWh] 0.200835 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.4 
Construction time [Year] 6 5 5 3 3 
Plantlifetime [Year] 60 60 60 60 60 
Overnightcost[CHF/KWe] 4421 INCAS INCAS INCAS INCAS 
DESIGN SAVING FACTOR 100% 100% 100% 90% 88% 
MODULARIZATION SAVING FACTOR 100% 100% 100% 85% 73.72% 
Table 7Main assumptions for the model 
 
RESULTS 
 
The main results of this analysis are summarized in Table 8 and 
Table 9by key economic and financial indicators. 
From these tables it is possible to point out: 
 capital remuneration (IRR) for an investment in new 
nuclear capacity is in the range of 12%-14%.  
 Profitability of SMR is only slightly lower than LR: the 
gap is about 0.5-0.7%. This is reflected in 3-3.6€/MWh 
higher LUEC. 
 When 1565MWe NPP are considered stronger cost 
efficiency emerges as the result of EOS: LUEC is 7-
7.6€/MWh higher for SMR.  
 When 6-year construction schedule is assumed for 
1565MWh plant, which seems more realistic than vendor 
5-year estimation, this gap is reduced to 6-6.5€/MWh, but 
is still relevant 
 The IRR value is higher for 150 MWe than 300 MWe. The 
economy of replication (learning and site sharing) partially  
compensate the EOS; design modularization and 
simplification definitely fill the gap.  
The case of two sites determines worsen performance in LR 
and SMR due to reduced economy of replication.In countries 
with very scarce resource, multiple SMR may deployedon a 
longer timeframe. While allowing gradual new capacity 
increase to the grid,first units can finance the construction of 
the later deployed NPP, reducing and diluting the upfront 
investment.. However, in the Swiss scenario due to higher 
O&M and fuel costs as compared to the OCSE average and due 
to conservative assumptions on construction costs, self-
financing is almost negligible (not more than 5%). Nevertheless 
IDC are much lower for SMR due to better control over interest 
capitalization. TCIC is the sum of overnight construction costs 
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and IDC: thanks to lower IDC, it has to be remarked that 
300MWe plants program and “Large Reactors” (i.e. 1200MWe 
or 1050MWe) have the same TCIC. On the contrary, 150MWe’s 
TCIC is 22-28% higher than 1565MWe, even if TCIC is only 
17-23% higher than 1565MWe, due to small plants’ lower IDC. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3show self-financing capability of the 
SMR projects on later deployed units.  
 
 V.LARGE V.LARGE LARGE MEDIUM SMALL 
SIZE [MWe] 1565 1565 1200 300 150 
financing mix 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
constr. Duration 5y 6y 5y 3y 3y 
IRR 14.37% 13.98% 13.02% 12.34% 12.53% 
LUEC[CHF/MWh] 63.329 64.418 67.31 70.92 70.29 
OVERNIGHT [Milion of CHF] 19626 19675 22882 24287 23916 
IDC [Milion of CHF] 1881 2328 2198 1356 1331 
TCIC [Milion of CHF] 21507 22003 25080 25643 25247 
SELF-FIN [Milion of CHF] 1069 932 1035 234 281 
EQUITY[Milion of CHF] 3711 3749 4369 4811 4727 
DEBT [Milion of CHF] 16726 17323 19675 20599 20238 
Table 8Results scenario 1 – Power Installed equivalent to 3 Large Reactors 
 V.LARGE V.LARGE LARGE MEDIUM SMALL 
SIZE [MWe] 1565 1565 1050 300 150 
constr. Duration 5y 6y 5y 3y 3y 
IRR 14.72% 14.13% 12.54% 12.04% 11.82% 
LUEC[CHF/MWh] 63.183 64.29 69.514 72.057 72.74 
OVERNIGHT[Milion of CHF] 13045 13078 15594 15674 16689 
IDC[Milion of CHF] 1271 1566 1540 879 935 
TCIC[Milion of CHF] 14316 14644 17133 16553 17624 
SELF-FIN[Milion of CHF] 321 270 80 14 81 
EQUITY[Milion of CHF] 2545 2562 3103 3132 3321 
DEBT[Milion of CHF] 11450 11812 13951 13407 14220 
Table 9Results scenario 2 - – Power Installed equivalent to 2 Large Reactors 
 
Figure 2 Scenario 1- Medium reactor 50% Equity. Incas calculated for each reactor the exact amount of Equity, debt and self-financing for 
each reactor 
 8 Copyright © 2011 by ASME 
 
Figure 3 - Scenario 1- Medium reactor 50% Equity. Incas calculated for each reactor the exact amount of Equity, debt and self-financing 
each quarter in the construction period 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
One of the greatest challenges in the construction of NPP is the 
public acceptability. The Fukushima accident renewed the fears 
against the nuclear energy and set plants’ safety as a prior 
requirement. 
SMR have improved safety standard and higher seismic 
robustness due to lower size of containment.  Results of this 
analysis show that SMR loose some cost-efficiency against 
very large NPP (i.e. 1565MWe) on account of EOS, but also 
that very large plants economics are very sensitive to 
construction schedule delays. Multiple SMR can exploit the 
economy of replication and offer design enhancements and 
modularization cost savings that bring they competitiveness in 
line with large plants (i.e. 1200-1050MWe). Moreover, SMR 
represent a scalable, flexible investment strategy for gradual 
new capacity installed. Shorter construction time and 
consequent shorter PBT for each SMR unit explains better IDC 
control over construction period, against considerable interest 
capitalization and TCIC escalation incurred by large plants’ 
projects. 
Should the Swiss government as the stakeholder of Swiss 
utilities, pursue the nuclear option by mean of SMR technology, 
it would have to promote an appropriate campaign to inform 
the citizens about superior safety features of SMR to amend the 
public concern and conviction that all NPP are as unsafe as the 
40year old Fukushima reactors. 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
IDC = Interests During Construction 
IRR = Internal Rate of Return (%) 
Ke = cost of equity (%/y) 
Kd= cost of debt (%/y) 
LUEC = Levelised Unitary Electricity Cost 
NPV = Net Present Value 
OCC = Overnight Construction Cost 
PBT = Pay Back Time (y) 
TCIC = Total Capital Investment Cost 
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ANNEX A 
CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE 
 
 Year 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1600 MWe Reactor 
            site1 1 1 1 1 1 
       site2 
    
1 1 1 1 1 
   site3 
       
1 1 1 1 1 
             1200 MWe Reactor 
            site1 1 1 1 1 
        site1 1 1 1 1 
        site2 
    
1 1 1 1 
    site3 
        
1 1 1 1 
             300 MWe Reactor 
            site1 1 1 1 
         site1 
  
1 1 1 
       site1 
    
1 1 1 
     site1 
      
1 1 1 
   site1 
        
1 1 1 
 site1 
         
1 1 1 
site2 1 1 1 
         site2 
  
1 1 1 
       site2 
    
1 1 1 
     site2 
      
1 1 1 
   site2 
        
1 1 1 
 site2 
         
1 1 1 
site3 1 1 1 
         site3 
   
1 1 1 
      site3 
      
1 1 1 
   site3 
         
1 1 1 
             150 MWe Reactor 
            site1 1 1 1 
         site1 1 1 1 
         site1 
  
1 1 1 
       site1 
  
1 1 1 
       site1 
    
1 1 1 
     site1 
    
1 1 1 
     site1 
      
1 1 1 
   site1 
      
1 1 1 
   site1 
        
1 1 1 
 site1 
        
1 1 1 
 site1 
         
1 1 1 
site1 
         
1 1 1 
site2 1 1 1 
         site2 1 1 1 
         site2 
   
1 1 1 
      site2 
   
1 1 1 
      site2 
     
1 1 1   
   site2 
     
1 1 1 
    site2 
       
1 1 1 
  site2 
       
1 1 1 
  site2 
         
1 1 1 
site2 
         
1 1 1 
site3 1 1 1 
         site3 1 1 1 
         site3 
   
1 1 1 
      site3 
   
1 1 1 
      site3 
     
1 1 1 
    site3 
     
1 1 1 
    site3 
       
1 1 1 
  site3 
       
1 1 1 
  site3 
         
1 1 1 
site3 
         
1 1 1 
 
